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Who’s, What’s, I Don’t Know
A Musement on Eco’s Pragmatism
Lucio Privitello
“As a rule it is with our being reduced to a
minimum that we live; most of our faculties lie
dormant because they can rely upon Habit, which
knows what there is to be done and has no need of
their services.” (Marcel Proust (1981 [1919]),
“Within a Budding Grove – Place-Names: the
Place,” Vol. 1, Remembrance of Things Past, p. 706).
“Thirdness pours in upon us through every avenue
of sense.” (C. S. Peirce, “The Nature of Meaning,” 
7 May 1903, EP2: 211).
 
1. Retroduction
1 In the beginning was the guess,  and in the end there is  habit;  two edges of  a  living
continuum. To begin is to take a guess, while simultaneously being supported in this play
of abductive inference by culture and human interests (habits, or perhaps what some call
“pertinences”)  that  have  had,  and  continue  to  have,  influence  as  a  “living  idea,”  a
mediated presentation on the guessing process tied and pulled along to a world from
which it  sways from similar weaves.1 Welcome to Thirdness.  And this is  the work of
retroduction;  “spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason,” as Peirce would say.  We
start somewhere, with something, but that is always in the sum-of-things (summa rerum). 
[…] it must be confessed that if we knew that the impulse to prefer one hypothesis to
another  really  were  analogous  to  the  instincts  of  birds  and wasps,  it  would  be
foolish not to give play,  within the bounds of  reason;  especially,  since we must
entertain some hypothesis, or else forgo all further knowledge than that which we
have already gained by that very means. (Peirce, “The Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God” (1908), EP2: 443-4, original emphasis; see also EP2: 217-21)
2 By stating “that which we have already gained by that very means,” we have a guess-in-
knowledge as accumulated “historical truth,” to which the later Peirce (in 1913), equates
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with “faith in common-sense and in instinct.”2 Such is the nature of retroduction. It is
“the  deliberate  yielding  of  ourselves  to  that  force  majeure,  –  an  early  surrender  at
discretion, due to our foreseeing that we must, whatever we do, be borne down by that
power, at last […] a surrender to the insistence of an idea […] irresistible […] imperative.”3
Synechistic pertinence. 
3 And what insistent idea may that be? In this case it is the relation of Eco to some variety
of  pragmatism.4 Peirce  plays  into  this  heavily,  as  do  the  roots  and  fruits,  and
indefinability  of  Pragmatism,  mentioned  in  sections 1  and  2.  Eco’s  connection  to
pragmatism will, as it has already, open the flood gates to waves of ologi’s and isti’s,5 as
happens in most retroductive inquiries; geology, evolution, and explanatory sciences (as
Peirce saw it).  Each one “theaters of controversy,” of exquisite staging, scores, scenic
talents,  histories,  and  hybrid  iterations.  Yet,  the  most  hy-bri[d]vidi of  them  all  is
philosophical and cultural scholarship, if not philosophical commedia, and now perhaps
even the Eco-sophical. Many claim to be ricostruzionisti, masterfully deflecting objections
as to whether or not they can be held to certain proposed notions if questioned as ologo,
when, at best, they were merely proposing a reading as ista.6 In this case it was Eco’s ista 
ricostruzionista (with a chef’s dash of ologo) reading of “iconismo primario” that gives rise
to questions regarding this Peircean reassessment as we shall see in section 2. Section 3
will change tone and open up to a darker voice, and a few issues in Eco’s writing (or not)
on the “comic,” particularly his essays “Pirandello Ridens,” and “The Comic and the Rule.”
 
2. Who’s: Wright, Green, Peirce
4 As the nursery to the birth of American pragmatism, old Cambridge, in the early 1870s,
had “The Metaphysical Club.” Therein, but dramatically narrowed down for the purpose
of this brief study, we find Chauncey Wright (1830-1875), and Nicholas St. John Green
(1830-1876). Some believe that Green championed and extended Bain’s definition of belief
in a legal and practical level, and can be considered an uncle of pragmatism. Of course, in
the  middle  of  all  this  there  was  Peirce  who  preached  his  principle,  calling  it
“Pragmatism.”7 It  was in this nursery that Wright,  the other (more bizarre)  uncle of
pragmatism, most likely discussed what he called a “Philosophy of Habit.” This was, in his
eyes, initially to supplement utilitarianism, so actions more closely serve the real ends of
nature, and the economy of life, as “quantity in worth, dignity, or rank.”8 Utility was thus a
principle that we regard as a standard, internally considered, in Wright’s words, by “how
steadily  we  can  think  under  strong  feeling,  or  how strongly  we  can  feel  with  clear
thoughts.”9 Notice  the  already  budding  grove  of  synechism.  We  can  imagine  the
conversations where Wright, Green, and Peirce, would exchange on these considerations,
and where Wright,  as  Peirce mentioned,  acted as  the “boxing-master  whom we,  –  I,
particularly, – used to face to be severely pummeled.”10 Boxing masters are the ‘damndest
of rationalists,’ as James once described Wright to G. H. Palmer. For Wright, more of an
empiricist and critical nihilist, habit was not about the common effectiveness of motives
in proportion to everyday usefulness or reasonableness, but as reliant on just, natural
inclinations,  that  he  referred  to  as  ‘fixed  habit,’  “an  integrant  part  of  a  system  of
dispositions which, as superintending, so far as it goes, the whole of the conditions of
human life, and leading to the conservation of the whole, itself included, is what we call
conscience […].”11 Peirce expresses a similar thought in noting that “intellectual power is
nothing  but  the  facility  in  taking  habits  and  in  following  them in  cases  essentially
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analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote from, the normal cases of connections
of feelings under which those habits were formed.”12 Further, and even closer to Wright’s
general views, Peirce stated that “the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent
come more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined,
which  is  what  we  strive  to  express  in  calling  them  reasonable”  [or  “concrete
reasonableness”  as  he  later  stated]  (Peirce  CP5:  433;  original  emphasis).  Echoes  of
Wright’s cosmic weather and “counter-movements” (see Wright 1971a: 177, 74). 
5 The  influence  of  Wright  is  clear,  especially  his  view  where  “nothing  justifies  the
development of abstract principles in science but their utility in enlarging our concrete
knowledge of nature […] [as] working ideas – finders, not merely summaries of truth”
(Wright  1971:  56).  Or  further,  “we do not  inquire  what  course  has  led  to  successful
answers in science, but what motives have prompted pertinent questions” (Wright 1971:
48),  and that  the  “questions  of  philosophy proper  are  human desires  and fears  and
aspirations – human emotions – taking an intellectual form” (Wright 1971: 50). One can
easily notice Peirce ironing out his positions with the ghost of Wright in his article “How
to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878), as the “essence of belief is the establishment of [a rule of
actions, or, say for short] a habit,”13 carried further into his later 1895 “Of Reasoning in
General,” and again in the 1905 piece, “What Pragmatism Is,” and his 1907 “Pragmatism.”
It is in his sixth Harvard lecture from May 7, 1903, entitled “The Nature of Meaning” that
we see how close to Wright he came:
This  Faculty  [Insight]  is  at  the  same  time  of  the  general  nature  of  Instinct,
resembling the instinct of animals in its so far surpassing the general powers of our
reason and for its directing us as if we are in possession of facts that are entirely
beyond the reach of our senses. It resembles instinct too in its small liability to
error; for though it is wrong oftener than right, yet the relative frequency with
which it  is  right is  on the whole the most wonderful  thing in our constitution.
(Peirce, EP2: 217-8)
6 Peirce never abandoned this view. In one of his last writings, from September-October
1913, we hear again about “human intellectual instincts,” and how Peirce “select[s] the
appellation ‘instinct’ in order to profess [his] belief that the reasoning-power is related to
human nature very much as the wonderful instincts of ants, wasps, etc., are related to
their several natures” (Peirce EP2: 464). It would be difficult indeed to get closer than this
to pragmatism’s “instinctive attraction to living facts” (Peirce CP5: 44). 
7 In  1873  (after  the  breaking  up  of  the  Metaphysical  Club),  Wright  was  knee-deep  in
working on the article “Evolution of Self Consciousness.” He points out how the term
“rational” (or “scientific”) is “knowledge [that] comes from reflecting on what we know
in the common-sense,  or semi-instinctive forms,  or making what we know a field of
renewed research, observation, and analysis.” This does not neatly divide the minds of
humans and non-human animals, but only, as he writes, “divides the knowledge produced
by outward attention from that which is further produced by reflective attention.” This
amounts to how, in humans, images act as signs to govern lines of thought, reasoning,
and research, whereas “with reference to the more vivid outward signs, they are, in the
animal mind, merged in the things signified, like stars in the light of the sun” (Wright
1971: 207, 209).14 In his 1913 unpublished piece, Peirce is also clear about his synechistic
view, contra Bacon’s despair that “Nature far exceeds the subtlety of the human mind.”
This is explained with an example from an experience he had with the then Professor of
Greek at Harvard, E. A. Sophocles, who, as Peirce stated, “was a curious observer of many
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other things than the habits of aorist infinitives.” For Peirce the colligation of one fact to
another related fact has a person combine these as a surprising third fact, and there,
“though [Peirce] say[s] that is it by instinct that he draws the inference [retroduction],
[he] nevertheless admits that he may be very much mistaken [negative realism?], just as
such animals as dogs and ants are sometimes betrayed by their instincts […] yet the
instincts  of  more  intelligent  mammals,  birds,  and  insects,  sometimes  undergo
modification  under  new  experience”  (Peirce,  EP2:  467;  original  emphasis).  And  here
Peirce recounts the story of the toad that lost one eye, was near starvation due to missing
his prey, but regained (retooled) his aim, after a few weeks. Notice again the echoes of
Wright:
Command  of  signs,  and,  indeed,  all  the  volitional  or  active  powers  of  animals,
including attention in perception, place it in relation to outward things in marked
contrast  with  its  passive  relations  of  sensation  and  inattentive  or  passive
perception. The distinctness, or prominence, in consciousness given by an animal’s
attention  to  its  perceptions,  and  the  greater  energy  given  by  its  intentions  or
purposes  on  its  outward  movements  cannot  fail  to  afford  a  ground  of
discrimination between these as causes, both of inwards and outward events, and
those  outward causes  which  are  not  directly  under  such  control,  but  form  an
independent system, or several distinct systems of causes. This would give rise to a
form of self-consciousness more immediate and simple than the intellectual one,
and  is  apparently  realized  in  dumb  animals.  (Wright,  “Evolution  of  Self-
Consciousness,” 1971: 224)
8 Peirce maintains his view on instinct (clearly against species solipsism) throughout his
intellectual development, and from his 1898 lecture “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life”
we read, “thus reason, for all the frills it customarily wears, in vital cases, comes down
upon its  marrow-bones  to  beg  the  succor  of  instinct”  (EP2:  32).  Wright’s  position is
written all over this. In the same lecture he pushes it further by adding how reasons are
“excuses which unconscious instinct invents to satisfy the teasing ‘why’s’  of the ego.”
Much later (in the autumn of 1913) we find Peirce returning to this view, where “Reason
is a  sort  of  instinct,”  and laments that  we have been blind to the “just  authority of
instinct” (EP2 472; original emphasis). In-between these dates, and from a letter from
1908 to Lady Welby, we find how Icons, when referred to interpretants are “Suggestives”
“assuring their interpretants by ‘Instinct’” (EP2: 481).15 
9 Somewhere within this tangle one can again take up and press Eco’s idea of “primary
iconism.” The Peircean use of the term “assuring” (very Third indeed), in this instance
would serve as a way to clarify what Eco mistakenly believes is a primum, under the idea
of “primary iconism,” but is instead, in the semblance of a moment, a history (or habit) of
“pertinences”  rolled  into  one.16 This  history  of  pertinent  recognition  is  the  very
recursiveness of “degenerate” Thirdness.17 
The most degenerate Thirdness is where we conceive a mere Quality of Feeling, or
Firstness, to represent itself to itself as Representation. Such, for example would be
Pure Self-Consciousness, which might be roughly described as a mere feeling that
has a dark instinct of being a germ of thought. This sounds nonsensical, I grant. Yet
something can be done toward rendering it comprehensible. (Peirce, EP2: 161)
10 Any personal experiential habitus is already sub specie vinculum to degenerate Thirdness.
What we gather from the letters of Wright, which would have made up many discussion
topics,  is  that  the  intuitive  and  non-intuitive  boils  down  to  an  issue  of  logic,  not
psychology,  and  more  precisely  that  “cognitions  which  cannot  be  analyzed  by
introspection are called intuitions [or] data, axioms, [and] premises of logical processes
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[…] but no amount of introspection can analyze a cognition down to the bare, unrelated
data  of  senses  […]  this  would  be  to  dissolve  all  of  the  links  which  bind  sensuous
impression to consciousness […]” (Wright 1971: 128). Here is Wright against any primary
iconism, molar, molecular, or for the expressed purposes of an interpretive kick in the
pants. Similarly, no amount of pertinence, and no amount of “pertinentizzazione di un
soggetto interpretante che ritaglia un piano enciclopedico di pertinenza”18 can begin a
series, due to pertinence (or levels of pertinence) being always-already a tremor from
within a concrete historical series from which, even subsumed under a personal aspect, is
Likeness experientialized, or as Peirce would have it, the “capacity for experience” (EP2: 8,
original emphasis;  CP1: 307).  Pertinence, like belief,  is a ready-made cluster of belief-
formations, where a person does not act on one belief, or one pertinence. 
11 Eco’s reference to Giorgio Prodi’s “Signs and Codes of Immunology” (1988), well as Prodi
(1977), is a tempting by-path to revisit,  and to entertain some type of Wright-Darwin
connection, but, alas, Wright, with Bacon, would say they are no more than “anticipations
of the mind.”19 Let us recall a cornerstone in Peirce’s architectonic: “Thirdness pours in
upon us through every avenue of sense.” (EP2: 211).20 Yet even to this, Wright’s harsh
rebuttal can be heard: “It is possible that laws exist absolutely universal, binding fate and
infinite power as well as speech and the intelligible use of words; but it is not possible
that the analytic process of any finite intellect should discover what particular laws these
are.” (Wright 1971: 229).21 Peirce did not forget this lesson, and took it with him as a
shield against the unknowable, and medusian “thing-in-itself.” With this in mind, what
sense does Eco’s citation from De docta ignorantia, II, ii, of Nicola Cusano even amount to, if
not a couched nod to the tough critical skeptico-nihilism of Chauncey Wright? (See Eco,
“La  soglia  e  l’infinito,”  2007:  172.  See  also  Fabbrichesi  2017:  321.)  Perhaps  Cusano’s
citation is  best  re-written as,  “The infinite  Form can only  be  received in  a  burst  of
laughter.” 
12 Before moving on to section 2, let us return for a moment more to Old Cambridge, and
recall Peirce’s debt to Nicholas St. John Green. Green was a “skillful lawyer and a learned
one  [with]  his  extraordinary  power  of  disrobing  warm  and  breathing  truth  of  the
draperies of long worn out formulas was what attracted attention to him everywhere.”22
And  further,  Peirce  saw  in  Green  “an  overflowing  spirit  of  good-fellowship,  and  a
Rabelaisian humor, without the Rabelaisian cynicism.”23 That is some praise coming from
Peirce. I believe that Eco would have welcomed, and deserved, the same description, and
praise.24 As was mentioned earlier, Green championed and extended, as Peirce saw it,
Bain’s definition of belief, viz., “that upon which a man is prepared to act,” from a legal
anti-formalist position, along with his anti-nominalist approach to causes (proximate or
remote). In all this, Green can be considered an uncle of pragmatism, if Bain’s definition
(whether Green indeed had him in mind), was its grandfather. From his legal training,
teaching, and practice, Green was an example of how purpose, and following through on
purposes, are the basis and means of world-making-meaning rooted in outcomes of the
actions involving belief. I agree with Menand (2001: 225), that Green was more influenced
by, and was probably citing (as he did in his Notes, and Reviews) the works of Judge James
Fitzjames Stephen (1829-1894),  and in particular,  A General  View of  the Criminal  Law in
England (1863) in his statements on belief. Nevertheless, Green’s position as a legal scholar
and widely cultured teacher made way for  an understanding of  how laws (and legal
practices) are products (results) of social practices, setting Green on the front lines of the
scission between legal formalism and legal realism.25 
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13 It would not be difficult to image the discussions between Green, Peirce, Wright, (and
Holmes), upon the statements that “the desire to act and the desire to act successfully are
ultimate facts in human nature,” and that “without belief men cannot act,” and that
“belief  is  [not a passive reception of  external  facts]  but an active habit  involving an
exertion of will.”26 Closer textual evidence can be gleaned from Green’s articles, and notes
and reviews from 1869 to 1876, and we can continue to imagine how similar problems and
positions could have been brought up in discussions at The Metaphysical Club, (their last
meeting held sometime in mid-late November 1872). 
14 In his review, “Power of the Will Over Conduct” Green states: “There is always a tendency
to act out an idea. […] This tendency is something distinct from, and something often
acting in opposition to the will. It acts with a strength proportioned to the vividness of
the idea [and] a multitude is enough to show that the tendency, in spite of reason or the
will to act out an idea, is not an exception but a universal rule.” (Green 1933: 168). In the
review, “The Maxim that a Man is presumed to Intend the Natural Consequences of his
Acts,” Green gives a few examples where this maxim, considered a presumption of fact
for the jury to consider, was clarified and supported as such by James Fitzjames Stephen,
who Green cites from General View of the Criminal Law of England: 
Proof that a man’s body has gone through a set of motions usually caused by a
certain  state  of  mind  raises  a  presumption  that  they  were  so  caused  in  the
particular case at issue […] because it recognizes the fact that every action consists
as such of inward feelings and outwards motions, the motions forming the evidence
of the feelings […] the way in which, in fact, he did move is the only trustworthy
evidence on the subject, and consequently is the evidence to which alone (in all
common cases), the jury ought to direct their attention. (Green 1933: 192)
15 There are other examples of Green’s clear-headedness, his view of the practical service of
judgments,  and,  as  Peirce,  noted,  his  “extraordinary  power  of  disrobing  warm  and
breathing truth of the draperies of long worn out formulas,” the most notable being his
article, “Proximate and Remote Causes” (Green 1933: 1-17), where we read:
Nothing  more  imperils  the  correctness  of  a  train  of  reasoning  than  the  use  of
metaphor […] the phrase “chain of causation,” which is a phrase in frequent use
when this maxim is under discussion, embodies a dangerous metaphor […] causes
are pictured as following one upon the other in time, as the links of a chain follow
one upon the other in space. There is nothing in nature which corresponds to this.
Such an idea is a pure fabrication of the mind. (Green 1933: 11)
16 Wright would have agreed. He similarly questioned the usage of the term “belief,” stating
that, “what is called ‘belief,’ as to what it is, as well as to what are the true grounds or
cause of it, would, if the meanings of the word were better discriminated in common
usage, be settled by the lexicographer; for it is really an ambiguous term” (Wright 1971:
249). Even more, “reverence, or the want of it, has quite as much influence on men’s
beliefs, or professions of belief, as proofs and disproofs have” (Wright 1971a: 206). Peirce
was  also  working  out  these  problems  which,  in  1886,  he  called  the  “associational
determinations of belief,” and how daily life is full of these, and how it is best to allow
these “inferences” (unconscious, preconscious) their day and not engage them by some
“hypochondriac logic.”27 
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3. What’s: Primarily, Iconically, Peirce
17 Three texts by Eco will be mentioned in this section; Lector in Fabula (1979: 27-49), Kant
and the Platypus ([1997] 2000: 99-122), and “La soglia e l’infinito” (Eco in Paolucci, 2007:
145-76). Peirce’s statement, “Thirdness pours in upon us through every avenue of sense”
(EP2: 211), will once again serve as a stern recursive sign-post. In Kant and the Platypus,
where  he  took  up  reinterpreting  Peirce’s  iconism,  Eco  sways  under  the  sublime
firmament of  Parmenides’  rendition of  “Being,” (that should have been placed under
“The questioning of the poets” section 1.7), because Eco did not account for the legislative
roots, aim, and language of Parmenides’ poem, or the Eleatic legislator’s particular way of
figuring limits to signs (and naming) un-becoming for the public truth of  just-Being.
Parmenides’  does  not  emulate  due  to  a  negative  ontology,  nor  does  he  present  an
abstraction, but rather a quality of feeling, as Peirce would see it; and there, “nothing is
truer than true poetry” (EP2: 193, see also 194). Parmenides’ fragments were written in a
style so they could have been recited, as were Charondas’, or sung as were Zaleucus’ laws.
Solon also put his lawmaking tenants in poetic form. Add to this that “The first  has
nothing to do with the One of Parmenides […] nor any other unities that are talked about
in philosophy; for these are really unities of totality, and so imply plurality” (Peirce W5:
304). Back to Thirdness we come, and to where “Law is the revealing of being” (Plato,
Minos 317b).28 
18 Somewhat  like  Peirce’s  shift  in  1885,  Eco’s  shift  in  1997  was  (back,  or  forwards)  to
speculative philosophy proper. Peirce, due in part to his encounter and review of Royce’s
Religious Aspect of Philosophy,29 and Eco due to recalibrating his past works and positions
regarding the cognitive, semiotic, forms of narration, the unclassifiable, the encyclopedia,
reference, negotiation, Peirce, and his encounters with the figures and fierce debates on
iconism. In a way, this was Eco presenting his work as a conceptual platypus flying in the
face  of  easy  schematizing  (though  aiming  at  one),  due  to  his use,  critique,  and
composition of an enormous range of figures and themes in the history of philosophy,
without forgetting how it all re(as)sembles a story. 
19 In Kant and the Platypus, Eco is wrestling with Peirce, as a veritable Jacob. Eco states his
position against Pericean synechism by how we could ever “aspire to a thought that is so
complex (but  organic  at  the same time)  that  it  can explain the complexity (and the
organicity) of the world of our experience, or natural world […] [and in this case] the
thought presumes to proceed by given rules (and found in the making of the thought itself)
that for some reason are the same (still  unknown, however) as those of the ‘natural’
world that it thinks” (Eco 1985: 334-5, original emphasis; see also Eco 2000: 120-2, 255-6).
In Peirce we find a rebuttal that goes beyond spilling black ink: 
Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague potentiality […] I
draw a chalk line on the board. This discontinuity is one of these brute acts by
which alone the original vagueness could have made a step towards definiteness.
There is a certain element of continuity in this line. Where did this continuity come
from?  It  is  nothing  but  the  original  continuity  of  the  blackboard  which  makes
everything upon it continuous. (Peirce, CP6: 203)
20 Here we catch the difference between Eco’s negative realism, otherwise called contractual
realism, minimal realism, or temperate realism, (depending at what miraculous stage of
interpretation one finds themselves), and Peirce’s “process realism,” or where realism
and synechism are bounded and object of semiotic investigations.30 
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21 Would this be close enough to the Eco’s hard core of being (zoccolo duro dell’essere), or to the
endless wrapping of hard-wired (cable-optic) lines of resistance (“linee di tendenza”), best
translated as “lines of tendencies”?31 If so, then Eco is set back to explain how, in fact, this
heterogeneity can be traced, or de-marcated, if there is not some form of isomorphism, or
mutual influence.32 This issue can be further developed by returning to the idea of habit in
Peirce, and how Eco leaves it nearly untouched, by a rather Proustian-like “momentary
intermission of Habit.” This is this perhaps due to Eco previously having “put something
of [himself] everywhere, everything is fertile, everything is dangerous, and [he] can make
discoveries no less precious than in Pascal’s Pensées in an advertisement for soap.”33 Or is
it rather, because it is “well known that you can make Peirce say anything you want
according to how you approach him” (Eco 2000: 399 n.26)?34 If that is the case, so much
then for the limits of interpretation, or gesturing about when a given interpretation is
blatantly wrong, aberrant, or untenable, and farewell to the hope of any internal textual
coherence. What then will Peirce’s text not allow, and what could even be invalidated as
false? Of course, if Eco is rewriting Peirce as a riconstruizionista, and is picking through
some of the actual phases, textual histories, and history within which the works of Peirce
navigated, he is varying Peirce, spirit, letter, and philological knots, and approaches the
threshold of a novel.  Somewhat like a Baudolino,  Peirce is  abandoned to a perpetual
renovation and restoration of his beloved Arisbe. Then, just about anything goes. In the
end, Eco grew a habit of reinterpreting Peirce,  a “heavy curtain of habit,”35 (another
strike against any primary iconism), and this is what we must deal with, whether or not it
shrouded or revealed the reality of Peirce’s surrounding world. What we have is Eco’s
production of possible worlds of his own expectations and interpretative cooperation,
reminding us more of his work on the fable. Perhaps this is how Peirce’s texts lends the
reader a way to be managed in their anticipatory interpretative hopes, and incorporates
them at a discursive level, playing in turn to a world as/in a story.36 
22 The production of a habit is through an interpretant. That is clear, and accepted by Eco,
but that should signal (how final, or not, is debatable), that the possibility of guessing is
met “by qualitative standards, [themselves] habitually constructed over time, based on
the ethical (Secondness) and, in turn, the esthetic (Firstness)” (Tschaepe 2014: 124). This
is supported by the assessment of Gilmore (2006: 318) regarding the primacy of Peirce’s
aesthetics, which was what Peirce called “the secret of pragmatism” (CP5: 132, 1903). The
secret of pragmatism involves the idea that logic, as well as ethics, ultimately depends on
aesthetics. That means that we think ultimately by feeling. “We feel by a unity before we
understand it.”  (CP5:  132).37 Coming up against  Eco’s  admiration for Peirce’s  work of
perpetual interpretation (or revisable interpretations), we do find how he desires Peirce
to  speak.  “What  I  shall  do  is  try  to  say  how  I  think  Peirce  should  be  read  (or
reconstructed, if you will); in other words I shall try to make him say what I wish he had
said, because only in that case will I manage to understand what he meant to say.” (Eco
2000: 99).38 In Eco’s renditions, like so many trompe l’œil, there are perhaps some areas
where we can believe we are looking through the expertly painted window, but it can
never be painted as reflecting our own shadowy image looking through and back. At least
there is something in front of us, and that we can, at times, be mistaken.39 Eco is in an
incessant battle in finding coordinates for Peirce’s terms due to the tension between the
unreachable encyclopedic model, and the more economical under-certain-aspects model
of how an Immediate Object focuses the Dynamic Object (see Eco 1979: 38-40). It would
then appear  that  the  state  of  Peirce’s  writings  (articles,  lectures,  letters,  notes,  and
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drafts), were in themselves a ready-made intermediate hermeneutical space. There is no
overarching Peircean text, only elaborate segments, mostly rethinking, rewritings, and
re-expositions.  This would then call  for the historian within Eco’s  early work to rise
again, and similarly (with a touch of philology), as he did with the work of Aquinas’s
aesthetics, do with Peirce’s texts; that is, have him placed in his own time, considered as a
representative of his period, and how his ideas are seen as part of a problematic peculiar
to that period (see Eco 1988: vii-viii, and Marenbon 2017: 78-9). But that would be too
much the work of an “ologo.” 
23 Eco’s “La soglia e l’infinito” (Paolucci, 2007: 145-76), shows us something of what Peirce
believed  was  an  example  (a  segment  in  this  case)  of  the  long-run  (or  sufficient
investigation) of a community of investigators. This is exemplified in how Eco was in an
earnest dialogue with Paolucci’s measured and just criticism of the rendition of primary
iconism.40 Added to this dialogue we also find Eco’s use of the work of Fumagalli (1995) on
Peirce’s intuitionist turn after 1885, and the more recent encounter and discussion had
with Achille Varzi on issues of de dicto and de re boundaries conditions. Each of these
dialogue scenes, and one should also add Mameli (1997), come under, and are fitted into,
Eco’s own clarifications of his “Rilettura di Peirce,” (translated heavy-handedly as “Peirce
Reinterpreted”)  in  Kant  and  the  Platypus (2000:  99-122).  It  is  best  to  think  of  Eco’s
encounter as a “rereading.” That would be a more appropriate de re type of tracing of
boundary conditions, seeing how potentially indebted he had been to Peirce. Eco moves
on the field of scholarship, viz., ologi, isti, and ricostruzionisti, leave him in the same de re
boundary condition with Peirce’s texts, to which Eco seeks to free himself as a captive
ologo,  and  to  reemploy  (in  act)  Peircean  themes  (primary  iconism),  under  his  fully
developed, and pertinence-fixed “cognitive bias.” We can answer Paolucci’s question, “
Com´è  possibile  essere  peirciani  ed  echiani  allo  stesso  tempo?”41 (“How is  it  possible to be
peircians and echians at the same time?”) in the negative: we can’t, and why bother? On
Eco’s own reading, Peirce, “una persona di senno,” had his own pertinence-fix cognitive
bias, or what Peirce would call “voluntary habits.” His cosmology was a major one. That
was where intelligibility is a structure of the universe, and where “there is something in
nature to which the human reason is analogous” (EP2: 193), which is how the “ultimate
intellectual interpretants must be some kind of mental effects of the signs they interpret”
(EP2:  431).  He  also  had  his  logic,  mathematics,  the  logic  of  history,  and  historical
investigations. Peirce explains this clearly in his 1907 “Pragmatism” manuscript, under
“Variant 2” (EP2: 421-33, see also 549-50 n49). 
24 By what surrounding reality (Peirce’s surrounding world) would Eco then have the ability
to act upon if the habit produced retains none of the reality (textually speaking) due to
making Peirce say what Eco wished he had said? What stops would habit have, what lines
of resistance (tendencies), what dynamical object could there be, and what final interpretant
exist?  With  Rabelais,  we  must  admit  that  “privatio  praesupponit  habitum” (“lack
presupposes a previous habit”). One must then await a reasonable Pericean encyclopedia
(and history), and one in which Eco’s previous interpretive sign-paths will also be part
and parcel.  But on pain of betraying Eco’s view of the encyclopedia,  that by its very
nature as situated knowledge needs to remain local to circumstances and instances, how
would  a  Maximal  Encyclopedia  fair  in  light  of  Peirce’s  extraordinary  span  of  texts,
rewritings, and letters that make up his semio-cosmological philosophy system? No doubt
an Eco-inspired novel awaits, where theory and narration, the said and the shown become
the place of truth. Until then whither an Eco-Peircean pragmaticism, due to how “ideas
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tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar
relation of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity […] but gain generality and
become welded with other ideas.” (CP6: 104, and 301). What would count as our percept in
this case, and what would, in Peirce’s words, “prescribe what you are to do in order to
gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the world” (CP2: 330)? 
 
4. I Don’t Know: the Comic 
25 In pure play (or “musement”), one could draw a similarity between the comic character
Henry Russell,  and his  final  practical  joke played on his  relatives in the British film
Laughter in Paradise (Zampi 1951, 93 mins.), and Eco’s response (now ghost of a distant
author) to Donald Phillip Verene:
At a certain point I gave up and decided (with comical resolution) not to write [a
book on the comic] in expectation that after my death there would appear several
doctoral dissertations on what the unwritten work of mine would have been like.
(Verene, if he has nothing better to do, would make an excellent candidate for that
undertaking …). (Eco 2017: 179)42
26 I  extend this similarity not only to the issue of Eco and the comic,  (and his “critical
mission of parody”), but to what he has left us to ponder from his vast encyclopedia, now
part of Peirce’s homogeneously connected three Universes.43 With an irascible indexical
gesture, Eco has us look again at something, rethink, rework, and do (perhaps contrary to
some of our own entrenched habits and character traits), and in the end, we come out
having learned, (picked up habits of conduct44), transforming our lives a bit, learning how
to laugh at our own all-too-serious hunt for truth, and becoming more playful, so “to make
truth laugh.”45 
27 But for this to happen, as joyous as it could be, is a sure-fire way to muddy the claims of
primary iconism as advanced, defended, and elaborated by Eco, and to question if Firstness
can even figure any something at all, except as the tone of its own laughter that is another
irascible indexicality of the darkness of the pure dream of chance. While this might sound
to  be  under  the  influence  of  Bataille,  with  a  touch  of  Cioran,  it  prepares  us  for
encountering Pirandello; that contortionist of human interactions and habits.
28 In “Pirandello Ridens,” originally a conference paper delivered in 1968, (Eco 1994: 163-73),
we are shown how this child of Sicily is actually supremely humorless, shielding his own
humor, or smirks, from his land’s Medusian stare. This is partly due to an island that
twists the comic and humor from the forge of Hephaestian tragedy, if not from a ripe
provincialism. The laughter from Pirandello’s plays (and stories) are merely the sounds of
how spirit is gasping for air from the smoke and ashes of its own making. Perhaps this
can be linked to the “suspension of the suspension of disbelief” that Eco mentions, that
acts as perpetual doubt, undermining any code, and plunging humor into the dark corner
of  sarcasm,  ridicule,  and  the  caricature  of  habit.  This  can  be a  sticking  point  to  a
pragmatic account of a semiotics of humor. There is a failure, and disregard of pragmatic
competence in Pirandello’s  non-theory theory of  humor,  and that  is  reflected in the
failure of any deep cooperation as soon as a cultural grid is even faintly established. The
failure of creating something out of the knotted Pirandellian world is that it does not (or
refuses to) acknowledge that any original expectation has not been fulfilled, because the
original itself was a fake. The ur-joke is on it.46 In Pirandello’s Sicily, there is no patience
with a resolved habit (Thirdness) that is less than death. And so, there is no Cratylism
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between truth and its laughter, yet their folk etymology labors constantly, yet fruitlessly,
for an iconic remodeling of language, landscape, and world.47 Could this be one aspect of
why Eco became resolved that a complete and theoretical definition of humor is best left
alone? If  the intent of  Dorfles  to analyze the “mechanisms underlying every kind of
humor” failed, Eco was not one to blindly follow suit.48 Or is it because the process of
“detachment” or “alienation” is just too entrenched within Pirandello, that there is a lack
of that something to be detached from? Put in a Peircean way (but against two of his “Four
Incapacities”),  “Pirandello Ridens” begins to uncover how the absolutely in-cognizable
(detachment in detachment, or meta-ostranenie) feigns an intuitive grasp of what it posits
as already lost.49 Perhaps this meta-detachment comes within the comic to retroduce what
“knocks at the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway,”50 but more often times
than  not, our  understanding  ends  up  being  greeted  by  a  “strained  expectation  being
suddenly reduced to nothing.”51 In humor there is a threshold, but no liminal, and this is
how humor frequently passes beyond the comic, due to the lack of a standard of measure
with sympathy that has only the sky as a limit to its cruelty. It is clear that Pirandello’s
laughter (or smirk), contrary to Eco’s open and giving “maieutic of possibles” (maieuta dei
possibili), is apocalyptic, thus suspending any and all dialectical play between order and
adventure and remaining a maieutic of impossibilities.52 
29 What happens when we turn to Eco’s “The Comic and the Rule”? This is another text on
the comic that emerged from a symposium presentation. The comic jeopardizes the rule
(s) because there can be no examination or confirmation of the nature of the rule as there
is in tragedy. This is another version of “don’t ask confirmation from the author!” A
spectator would say: “do not teach me my joy, or laughter, especially when I am not sure
of the dimensions caught-up in my laughter.”53 To do so would also be to overturn a
semiotic rule by asking the comedic author, and posit a rule-above that can be grasped
besides the effects it produces (fallible or infallible hilarity included). This would also
strain the pragmatic competence to reproduce a code for the effects that would mix
comedic sense from an array of aspects (social, textual, perceptual, etc.), without defining
a ground upon which the mixing occurs. At best, the comic is the haunting of tychism’s
quiet synechistic homology. At worst, the comic displays something in which the work of
interpretation has come to an end; a vengeful agapistic nihilism. In either case we have a
most fragile liaison that we guardedly carry forwards, and back, between natural world
and posited world, and where the “as if” clings to its hope of commensurability even when
it  is  as  f’d as  can be. 54 The comic  plays  devilishly  with a  fathomless  bisociation:  the
constitutive and the regulative, real-ideal. Comedy’s very staging feigns both. 
30 “The Comic and the Rule” leaves us with a surprise. It was an “opening of the door” in the
experiential “humorous mechanism of symposia” (and let us admit, scholarship itself).
This is where we can hear Eco’s actual sense of humor, and his profound lesson for us all.
55 From his  vast  experiences  through many  decades,  venues,  fields,  friendships,  and
mentoring,  we  see  how  these  arenas,  where  tentative  and  slow meekly  measured
transgressions poised as would-be rules, become the undoing of any unquestioned lofty
rule, and thus where comic timing reveals the spaces where the what that is le propre de
l’homme belongs: somewhere between chorus-less tragedy and medieval farce. Behold the
commedia of philosophy. Yet, as a warning, and in the words of Eco’s beloved Peirce, just
months before his death, we hear: “I also realize that in these times and as long as I shall
live, it is those who know the least and who can least continue [to be] patient who are
able to decide how matters shall be conducted.” (EP2: 475). 
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NOTES
1. On the issue of guessing see the following works of C. S. Peirce: R 692.29, EP1: 287, EP2: 25, 108,
217, 443-4, CP1: 118, CP5.47, 173, 586, 591, and 603-4. On Peirce’s use of “living idea,” or a law that
governs mental phenomena, and “general idea [as] the mark of habit,” (original emphasis) see
CP6: 152, CP7: 498, and CP6: 141, and CP5: 181 on the abductive suggestion. See also Gilmore
(2006: 314-5, 318). 
2. Peirce EP2: 446. If one follows through with this citation there is a close parallel, as we shall
see,  with  Chauncey  Wright’s  investigative  positions.  Peirce  continues,  “This  brings  him,  for
testing the hypothesis, to taking his stand upon Pragmaticism, which implies faith in common-
sense and in instinct, thought only as they issue from the cupel-furnace of measured criticism.
[The Neglected Argument] is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of
the  very  highest  Plausibility,  whose  ultimate  test  must  lie  in  its  value  in  the  self-controlled
growth of man’s conduct of life.” Peirce’s reflections on history (a lacuna in Eco’s appropriation)
needs revisiting. See Miller 1971, and Esposito 1983. 
3. See Peirce, “The First Rule of Logic,” EP2: 46-7. Here too we see how in 1898, Peirce was, in
ways, carrying on Chauncey Wright’s examples of the philosophy of education and pedagogy that
Peirce actually experienced face-to-face in discussions, questions, and exchanges in Cambridge as
part of The Metaphysical Club. For a brief foray into Wright on education see Privitello (2005:
627-49).  See  also  Eisele  (1964:  51-75)  on  Peirce’s  philosophy  of  education,  with  emphasis  on
mathematics. 
4. For a clear, brief, and historical framing of Eco’s position in Italian pragmatism see Maddalena
(2014: 11-2). 
5. On the mention of “ologi” and “isti” see Eco’s “La soglia e l’infinito,” in Paolucci (2007: 147). 
6. Could one level a similar criticism to Eco, that Eco once leveled against Croce, that is, being “a
past master at dismissing problems by defining them as pseudo problems”? In this case the terms
of criticism are much more refined, as Eco masterfully displayed in “La soglia e l’infinito.” See
also Eco (1994: 163).
7. See Peirce, “The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (EP2: 448) for his description of
the event.
8. Wright (1971a: 287; original emphasis).
9. Wright (1971a: 224). 
10. Peirce (EP2:  399).  Though Peirce held Wright in high regard,  he seemed to have favored
Green’s approach, and used Wright, “that acute but shallow fellow,” “as a whetstone of wits,”
Perry (1964: 292). 
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11. Wright (1971a: 288; original emphasis). See how Peirce develops this in “Pragmatism,” July-
August 1907, EP2: 431n49, and in EP2: 448.
12. Peirce SW 152, “The Architecture of Theories” (1891).
13. Peirce SW 121.
14. See also Wright (1971: 211-2), and Wright (1866: 264). For a recent, albeit brief take on this
relationship between Wright and Peirce on signs, see Parravicini (2009: 270-1), and Parravicini
(2012: 195-8). 
15. See also Peirce’s “Qualitative Logic” of 1886 where “unconscious and uncontrolled reasonings
[…] often truer than if  they were regulated […] [show] the usual  superiority of  instinct  over
reason, and of practice over theory” (W5: 327). 
16. See Eco (2000: 161), Eco (2012: 98), and Eco (2017: 48) for his use of “pertinence” from Luis
Prieto (1975), and “affordance” from Gibson (1979). 
17. See Eco (2007: 160-1, 172, 176 n.12), and Paolucci (2007: 35-7). But here we may heed the
sentiments of Wright who in his final known letter from September 1, 1875, felt that “written
words  are  rivets  and chains  by  which our  freedom is  fettered,  our  mood pinioned,  and our
Protean lives set in false, because fixed posture […]” Wright (1971a: 355). Here we can also place
Peirce’s 1910 statement, in agreement with Papini, that pragmatism “cannot [or should not] be
defined” (CP6: 490). 
18. “Pertinence-zation of an interpretant subject that samples an encyclopedic delineation of
pertinence.” See Paolucci (2007: 36-37), and Eco in Paolucci (2007: 160, 172). 
19. See Eco (2000: 108-9), and Wright, “The Genesis of Species” (1971: 131-2, 135-6). 
20. In his fifth lecture at Harvard, 30 April 1903, Peirce first stated how “Generality, Thirdness,
pours in upon us in our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning […]” (EP2: 207). 
21. Thirty-four years after Wright’s death, Peirce censured James for “look[ing] up to far too
much” to Wright “who probably entrapped you in his notion that in some part of the universe
one and one perhaps does not make two […]” (Perry 1964: 292).
22. Peirce (EP2: 399). See also Frank (1954) for an excellent, and very detailed study on Green’s
influence on Peirce, and Holmes.
23. Peirce (W3: 210). 
24. On the issue of laughter in Eco (to which I will turn to in section 3), see Paolucci (2017a:
138-65, esp. 159-65).
25. See  Giovanni  Tuzet  (2011)  for  a  fascinating  study  on  legal  judgment  as  a  model  for
philosophical analysis, as well as Kellogg (2013) for upshots from the influence of Peirce (and
perhaps Green) on O. W. Holmes Jr. 
26. These citation are from James Fitzjames Stephen’s A General View of the Criminal Law (1863:
242). 
27. Peirce (W5: 327-8). For a later definition of “belief” see Peirce (EP2: 12). 
28. Even  though  Eco  (2000:  20)  believes  that  most  intimately,  and  initially,  “being  is  not  a
philosophical problem.” This should have been further elaborated when discussing Parmenides’
poem. 
29. Peirce’s encounter and review of Royce’s text (that prodded him to his major views in Guess at
the  Riddle),  was  followed  by  his  encounter  and  review  with  R. Perrin’s  Religion  of  Philosophy,
T. K. Abbott’s translation of Kant’s Introduction to Logic,  John Fiske’s The Idea of God,  as well as
Clifford’s Common Sense in the Exact Sciences, where Peirce even cited F. E. Abbot’s yet unpublished
Scientific Theism (a major influence on the riddle, sphinx, and guessing writ cosmologically). With
all this, Peirce was no doubt inspired again to take up his place in high philosophy. See Peirce
(W5: xxxvi-xxxvii, 221-34, 254-6, 257, 258-9, and 260-1). See also Fisch (1986: 235-8). 
30. For  the  term  “process  realism”  I  am  indebted  to  Sandra  Rosenthal’s  excellent  article
“Meaning as Habit: Some Systematic Implications of Peirce’s Pragmatism,” The Monist, 65, 2, “The
Relevance of Charles Peirce,” April, 1982: 230-45. On the issue of ground, and leaving black ink for
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a blackboard [chalkboard] see Eco (2000: 61, 64-5, 99-106, 113). The blackboard [chalkboard] is
“percept”-like, attending-motivation, not a sterile backdrop. 
31. See  Eco (2012:  106-9)  and Eco (2000:  50,  54).  I  imagine that  Eco would have enjoyed his
closeness to Green (and Holmes). In Green he would have approved that “all things in nature, all
things external,  all  idea,  all  sensations,  all  emotions,  shade into each other by imperceptible
degrees. No absolute lines can be drawn. Things are separated from one another by a debatable
ground.” Green (1933: 166-7). In “Di un Realismo Negativo” Eco is close to this legal-pragmatist
view in his mentions of limits, and of how “il nostro linguaggio sfuma nel silenzio [di fronte] alla
morte,” and how “la scienza [deve] rivedere persino l’idea di leggi che parevano definitivamente
adeguare la natura dell’universo.” All to say that “noi elaboriamo leggi proprio come risposta a
questa scoperta di limiti, che siano questi limiti non sappiamo dire con certezza, se non appunti
che sono dei ‘gesti di rifiuto’ […]” (Eco 2012: 106, 109). Holmes would add: “Legal, like natural
divisions, however clear in their general outline, will  be found on exact scrutiny to end in a
penumbra or debatable land. This is the region of the jury, and only cases falling on this doubtful
border are likely to be carried far in court.” (Holmes [1881] 1991: 127). Eco is thus closer to Green
(and Holmes) than to Peirce, when it comes to his variety of pragmatism. This is due to the work
of narration as to what is the case aspect in legal proceedings, which when expertly supported by
precedent  cases,  laws,  and  facts,  (and  rhetoric)  indeed  rises  to  a  many  times  frightful,  and
sometimes relief of an ordo et connexio rerum idem est ac ordo et connexio idearum. In another life,
Eco would have been a marvelous lawyer of eristic Ersatz. 
32. The recent work of Claudio Paolucci (2017: 251-77), “Eco, Peirce, and the Anxiety of Influence:
The Most Kantian of Thinkers” is crucial to unpack for a measured and valid critique of Eco’s use
and abuse of Peirce, as is his most recent text, Umberto Eco: Tra Ordine e Avventura, Paolucci (2017a:
see esp., 34-6, and 191-214). See also Paolucci (2007: 31-7). Another rich example to be studied,
and that gives a way to link primary iconism and negative realism (even in Eco’s own eyes), is
Rosella  Fabbrichesi’s  excellent  chapter:  “Eco,  Peirce,  and  Iconism:  A  Philosophical  Inquiry”
(2017: 305-24). Something I noticed in Fabbrichesi’s admirable study (see 2017: 308, 308n9, and
322n9), for which I will blame William James first all, is a misuse of the terms the “that” and the
“what” to explain how primary likeness could ever be between them [a relation!?]. These terms
are not James’ distinction, but an example of how his facile re-appropriations tend to muck-up
stricter theory. As he once transmogrified the term “pragmatism,” lifted Wright’s use of “cosmic
weather”  as  internal  weather  in  The  Will  to  Believe,  and  here  we  have  an  example  of  his
freebooting  from  F. H. Bradley’s  Appearance  and  Reality ([1893]  1969),  where  in  much  stricter
terms, and in a long and compelling argument (beyond the scope of this present study), there
would be no intelligible  reconstruction without  discrepancy of  the feeling from the felt,  the
subject from the universe (or Absolute), and hence, no way to defend or explain Eco’s examples,
without actually yielding to the stronger ontological hypothesis, or to Bradley’s strain of prag-
mysticism, or better, of a Schelling-Peirce cosmogenesis. William James did it again; he remains
one of the most charming of all philosophical bricoleurs. On the many letters between James and
F. H. Bradley, see Bradley (1999, and 1999a). While James mentioned C. S. Peirce to Bradley on
Jan. 3, 1898, (1999: 165), there is no mention of Peirce in the Bradley Papers. I speak here as an
“ologo.” 
33. Proust, “The Fugitive,” (1981 3: 553-4). 
34. In 1914,  a few months before his death, Peirce wrote “first […] I  have never published a
complete volume of my own, but only detached articles;  second, that I  have never published
anything except to record my observations of facts, or to present reasonings that I had long and
critically considered; and third, that I have never put forth anything in my own name unless it
was either quite new, as far as I was aware, or else have new reason for believing what others had
denied” (Peirce “An Essay towards Reasoning in Security and Uberty,” EP2: 469). 
35. Proust (1981 3: 554). 
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36. See Eco (1979: 207, 40, 40n6, and 39), where he cites Peirce at length from CP2: 519, 520, and
CP6: 401.
37. See Ibri (2016: 601). See also Anderson (1984: 466). 
38. See Eco (2017: 96) where he calls for extrapolating a thinker’s thought from his writing, and
“extrapolating the things he did not say explicitly, but could not have failed to think.” 
39. To run with this all  the way into the “unity of Infinite Thought,” see Josiah Royce (1958
[1885]: 384-435), chapter XI, “The Possibility of Error.” 
40. For an engaging critique of Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (but
beyond the present scope of this article) see Hartshorne (1964: 455-75, esp., 456-60). 
41. See Paolucci (2007: 34). For an answer by Paolucci we have: “Il lume naturale di Peirce e la
‘forza del falso’ in Eco traccino il punto di distanza più grande tra semiotica di Peirce e quella di
Eco […].” Paolucci (2017a: 201). 
42. I do not consider the film Laughter is Paradise to be an example of great comedy, though it is
pleasant enough. It featured Audrey Hepburn’s first professional appearance on film (43 seconds
long), as well as the seasoned Alastair Sim. The parallels between the details of the character
Henry Russell (the practical-joker), and Eco, go only as far as asking another to follow through on
a task (after their demise), that for family members in the plot of the film pushed them outside of
their  sad  entrenched  natures,  and  once  surprisingly  successful,  transformed,  and  looking
forward to an other-worldly inheritance,  are seen laughing at  themselves (transformed once
again, and even more deeply), when they realized the final prank was directed at their own very
enlightened carnivalization. 
43. See Peirce, “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” in (EP2: 435-8), and Letter to Lady
Welby, 23 December 1908 in (EP2: 478-9). 
44. This is where I see Eco’s pragmatic legacy, that is, his working within what Peirce stated was
“the only way to complete our knowledge of it  [a living comprehension of the meaning of a
concept] is to discover and recognize just what general habits of conduct a belief in the truth of
the  concept  (of  any  conceivable  subject,  and  under  any  conceivable  circumstances)  would
reasonably develop [and] what habits would ultimately result from a sufficient consideration of
such truth” (EP2: 448). Indeed, “the only assumption upon which [we] act rationally is the hope
of success” (W2: 272). The rest, to this day, is mere transmogrification, and pragmatischisms.
45. Eco  (1983:  491;  original  emphasis).  See  Eco  (2017:  179)  for  his  reply  to  Verene,  and  his
mention of parody. 
46. I am thinking here of the work of Hofstadter and Gabora in Attardo (1994: 226, 358), that
speaks of how the ur-joke “embodied a ‘local’ logic […] a distorted, playful logic, that does not
hold outside of the world of the joke.” But in Pirandello’s Sicily, and his treatise on humor, this
even  strains  to  hold  inside  its  very  own  world.  Peirce  can  again  help  us  understand  a
Pirandellian-Sicilian view of history where he writes: “If you complain to the Past that is wrong
and unreasonable, it laughs. It does not care a snap of the finger for Reason.” (CP2: 84). 
47. See Attardo (1994: 154-5, 173) for this issue of folk etymology. See also Fabbrichesi (2017:
321n8).
48. See Dorfles (1968). 
49. See  Eco  (1986:  277)  where  he  states:  “Humor  then  would  be  excessive  in  metalinguistic
detachment.”  A  Pirandellian  tragi-comedy  of  errors  in  detachment  can  be  seen  in  Andrea
Camilleri’s  description of  the fate  of  Pirandello’s  ashes.  See “Camilleri  e  lo  strano caso delle
ceneri di Pirandello,” Intervista di Angelo Melone, Ripresa di Maurizio Tafuro e Leonardo Meuti,
Montaggio di Elena Rosiello, in RepTv, la Repubblica.it, 27 Giugno 2017.
50. Peirce (CP7. 619). 
51. Kant, ([1790] 1952: 199; original emphasis), The Critique of Judgment,  Book II. Analytic of the
Sublime,  § 54.  This  can  be  pushed  into  the  direction  of  questioning  any  differences  between
legitimate/illegitimate interpretations if opened up to the multifarious niches of comedic styles
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and examples where reader/listener and author/comedian are, so to speak, sliced from the same
particular instance of public life, and thus of accepted reasonableness. This would be “critical
reasonable” enough, it seems. See Eco (1986: 125-32). 
52. See Paolucci (2017a: 144, 163). Another study awaits comparing Eco’s view and use of laughter
and the use and descriptions of laughter in Dostoevsky’s psychological realist writings. Perhaps
Eco’s not writing a treatise on comedy can be compared to Dostoevsky’s truncated work of a
comic  epic,  of  which we have only  one episode entitled “Uncle’s  Dream.”  One must  turn to
Dostoevsky’s Raw Youth (Podrostok), to see how “a man can give himself away completely by his
laughter, so that you suddenly learn all of his innermost secrets.” With that we must add a dash
of  Catullo:  “Risu inepto  res  ineptior  nulla  est” (Carmina,  XXXIX,  16).  And so,  doubt can only be
substituted by laughter,  if  and only if  the laughter is steeped from a profound immersion in
nature and cultures,  both as orders and adventures.  The rest is  the mere quivering,  twitter-
fingers, and the giggling of i coglioni (see Paolucci 2017a: 10-1). 
53. This  would  be  similar  to  what  Koestler  (1964:  36;  original  emphasis)  believed  was  the
presence of conflicting rules that “were merely implied in the texts,” but if we dare expose, or
explain, or “make them explicit [we] have destroyed the story’s comic effect.” This is what Eco
refers to in “The Comic and the Rule” by the “social or intertextual ‘frame’ or scenario already
known  to  the  audience,  you  display  the  variation,  without,  however,  making  it  explicit  in
discourse” (1986: 272). 
54. Perhaps here we need to turn to Wittgenstein and imagine a book of philosophy that would
be written entirely in the form of jokes, and ask: “why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep?
(And that is what the depth of philosophy is.)” Wittgenstein (1958: 47, § 111; original emphasis).
Or  are  we back  to  an  Eco-Kantian  “transpose-ability”  (trasponibilità),  where  we interpret  the
world (for those that think and see it  a joke,  or a laugh),  as if it  were, and thus find all  the
coherence of a world, and therein meld constitutive and regulative, blissfully ignorant of paying
penalty and restitution, and thus of there being no “No,” because a laugh of this magnitude could
never question its limits. See Paolucci (2017a: 204, 210-1). 
55. This sense of humor is also heard in “La soglia e l’infinito,” (Eco in Paolucci, 2007: 175n.3, and
176n7 and n11), and comes through with joy, toughness, and reverence in Paolucci (2017a: 34-7,
221-4). 
ABSTRACTS
This study is a three-part play of musement on a few details in the potentially infinite landscape
of Umberto Eco’s turn to, relations with, and adaptations of Pragmatism. This three-part guess
was product of an abandoned first guess-attempt entitled: “Who’s on First(ness)?” The present
title ensued naturally, and with some laughter, in recalling and using the play on words and
names  made famous  by  Abbott  and Costello.  Section 1  will  mention two uncles  of  American
Pragmatism. Section 2 will engage in Eco’s ista ricostruzionista (with a dash of ologo) reading of
“iconismo primario” (primary iconism) that raises questions regarding his Peircean rereading
and assessments. Section 3 will switch to a darker voice and touch upon a few issues in Eco’s
writing (or not) on the “comic,” particularly his essays “Pirandello Ridens,” and “The Comic and
the Rule.” 
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